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PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
UNDER FEDERAL AGENCY
NONDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
by Julia Lam ber*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits discrimination

on the basis of race in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. Similarly Title IX of the Education Amendments of
19722 prohibits sex discrimination in federally funded education programs or activities. Although the effect of Title VI has been felt
primarily in education, the statutory prohibition applies to an) feder-

ally funded activity, public or private, including hospitals, social service and welfare agencies, law enforcement agencies, housing, and
recreational programs. 3 Both statutes provide for administrative enforcement against prohibited activities. 4 This article explores the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law. (Visiting Assistant Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1978-79) B.A., DePauw University,
1969; J.D., Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, 1972.
From 1975 to 1977 the author was an attorney with the Office of General Counsel,
Civil Rights Division, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. During this time
she was involved in the litigation of Cannon v. University of Chicago discussed in this
article and Mandel v. HEW, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, Lodwig v. Board of
Educ., Leake o. University of Cincinnati,noted in footnotes 5, 85, and 132.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-1 to 2000d-6 (1976).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). Twenty-seven federal agencies have adopted regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.1 et seq. (1977) (Department of Agriculture); 15 C.F.R. § 8.1 et seq. (1977) (Department of Commerce); 32
C.F.R. § 300.1 et seq. (1976) (Department of Defense); 45 C.F.R. § 80.1 et seq. (1976)
(Department of Health, Education, and Welfare); 24 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq. (1977) (Department of Housing and Urban Development); 43 C.F.R. § 17.1 et seq. (1976) (Department of Interior); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.101-.112, 50.3 (1976) (Department of justice); 29
C.F.R. § 31.1 et seq. (1976) (Department of Labor); 22 C.F.R. § 141.1 et seq. (1976)
(Department of State); 49 C.F.R. § 21.1 et seq. (1976) (Department of Transportation).
Federal financial assistance is defined by regulation, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.2(g) (1977); 45
C.F.R. § 80.13(f) (1976), to include grants, loans, and contracts (other than procurement
contracts). But contracts of insurance or guaranty, such as FHA mortgages or bank deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, are exempt by statute. 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). See notes 13, 141 infra and
accompanying text.
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question of whether a private cause of action should be implied
against a noncomplying recipient of federal financial assistance under
Titles VI and IX. 5
Whether private causes of action may be implied under Titles VI
and IX is relevant to civil rights litigation even though there are other
statutes, Executive Orders, and constitutional provisions that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of race and sex. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19646 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of race and sex in the public and private sectors but does not proscribe
discrimination against students. 7 The fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution prohibit invidious discrimination on the basis of race and sex but apply only to state action. 8
5. This article does not address the availability of an action by an aggrieved individual against the appropriate federal agency charged with enforcement of a statute.
Actual or intended beneficiaries of federally assisted programs do have a cause of action
against these agencies. See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (challenge to HUD procedures in approving change in urban renewal plan from owneroccupied dwellings to rental dwellings). See also Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F.
Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (action against federal compliance agencies to compel release of information relative to equal employment and affirmative action and to require
enforcement of executive order); Thorn v. Richardson, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 299
(W.D. Wash. 1971).
Moreover, this article does not address questions concerning the evidence necessary
to establish substantive violations of Titles VI or IX nor with the thorny question of
whether a recipient's program is covered by Titles VI or IX. This latter Issue concerns
an interpretation of the terms "program or activity," especially in the "pinpoint" provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (limiting sanctions only to the particular political entity or program or part thereof found to be not in compliance); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). For
a discussion of this problem, see Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1968); Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542 (D. Md. 1976), rev'd en banc, 562 F.2d
914 (4th Cir. 1977), opinion withdrawn and aff'd by equally divided court, Nos. 761493, 76-1494 (4th Cir. Feb. 16, 1978) (the 1977 majority opinion included the vote of a
judge who died after oral argument but before the decision was rendered); Note, Administrative Cutoff of Federal Funding Under Title VI: A Proposed Interpretationof
"Program," 52 IND. L.J. 651 (1977); Comment, Title IX of the 1972 Education Ancndments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public Schools, 53 TEX. L. REV. 103, 107-113
(1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2 00 0 e-15 (1976).
7. A plaintiff alleging discrimination in an apprentice program would be covered by
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2(d) (1976).
Other civil rights statutes are consistent with Titles VI and IX but cover different
types of discrimination. E.g., Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) (prohibiting wage
differentials based on sex); Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§
3601-3631 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race and sex in housing);
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, §§ 503-504, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap).
8. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (state's grant of liquor
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Executive orders9 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race

and sex by government contractors and governmental agencies raise
even more difficult problems concerning the private cause of ac° Thus, the judicial determination issue than do Titles VI and IX.1

tion of whether a private cause of action will be implied under Titles

VI and IX may well determine whether a victim of racial or sexual
discrimination is afforded an effective remedy.
II.

STATUTORY FAmEwoRuK

Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides

that "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'" Section 602 authorizes each federal agency that extends federal financial assistance
to issue regulations effectuating the provisions of section 601.12 Regulations adopted under section 602 establish an elaborate administrative mechanism to enforce the provisions of section 601 including investigation of complaints filed by aggrieved persons, agency-initiated
compliance reviews, findings of noncompliance, resolution by informal means, and, if necessary, an administrative hearing ith the right

of internal appeals and judicial review. 13 Sections 901 and 902 of Title
license held insufficient to establish state action). See also, Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Benign Classificationin the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978).
9. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), as amended
by 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (nondiscrimination in employment by government contractors and subcontractors); Exec.
Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
app., at 10,297 (1976) (mandating equal employment opportunities for federal employees).
10. See note 136 infra.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
12. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1976) and regulations cited at note 3 supra (Title V);
45 C.F.R. §§ 86.1-.61 (1976) (Title IX).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7-.11, 81.1-.131 (1977); other agency
regulations, note 3 supra. In 1975 the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) published a notice of proposed rulemaking designed to consolidate enforcement
procedures applicable to all its civil rights authority. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1975) (to be
codified in 45 C.F.R. § 81.1 et seq.). These proposed rules were seen as eliminating the
filing and investigation of complaints. The department argued that the proposal did not
eliminate complaints but it did not require HEW to respond to complaints. Responding
to pressure from Congress and various civil rights groups, HEW withdrew the proposal
and indicated that a revised proposed rule would be issued. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,394 (1976).
To date, no new consolidated procedural regulation has been proposed.
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IX parallel the provisions of Title VI with the exception that the prohibition in section 901 is limited to sex discrimination in federally
assisted education programs and activities.' 4 Although several federal
agencies have enforcement responsibility under Titles VI and IX, this
article will focus on the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which has been the most actively involved in statutory enforcement. 15

The HEW procedural regulation applicable to both Titles VI and
IX provides that "[t]he responsible Department official or his designee will make a prompt investigation whenever a compliance review,
report, complaint, or any other information indicates a possible failure
to comply with [the regulation]."' 16 Neither the statutes nor the regulations explicitly authorize an aggrieved individual to bring suit in
federal court to enforce his or her rights under sections 601 and
901.17

Thus, the questions arise whether an individual can bring a

private cause of action to enforce Titles VI and IX and if that right is
dependent on the nonavailability of an administrative remedy.
III.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF IMPLIED PRIVATE
CAUSE OF ACTION

The practice of implying a private cause of action has had a checkered history. As early as 1916 the Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1682 (1976). Section 901(a) has several exemptions not relevant to the issue of private causes of action. For example, the admission practices of
private institutions of higher education, public or private elementary and secondary
schools, and traditionally single-sex public institutions of undergraduate higher education are exempt. Section 901(a) does not apply to military educational institutions or to
institutions controlled by religious organizations if § 901 would be inconsistent with
the religious tenets of the organization. See also exemption in §§ 901(a)(6)-(9), 907, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(6)-(9), 1686 (1976).
15. Other agencies have issued regulations under Title VI, see note 3 supra, and the
Department of Justice has been designated as the coordinating agency. Exec. Order No.
11,764, 3 C.F.R. 849 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 app., at
10,291 (1976). However, no other federal agency has issued regulations under Title IX
nor has any agency been designated as coordinator. For a discussion of the effect of this
void, see note 148 infra and accompanying text.
16. 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(c) (1977). This section is applicable to enforcement under Title
IX by incorporation, 45 C.F.R. § 86.71 (1977). Other agencies have adopted similar procedural regulations, see note 3 supra.
17. Other statutes outline both administrative remedies and private suits. E.g., 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (Title VII); 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1976) (Title VIII); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976). Executive Order No.
11,246, supra note 9, does not specifically authorize a private remedy. It is questionable
whether administrative regulations may authorize federal causes of action. See note 136
infra.
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Railway Co. v. Rigsby, 18 implied a private right to sue, and as recently as 1975 the Court reconfirmed the viability of the practice in
Cort v. Ash. 19 However, the Court's decisions have lacked consis-

tency and have not been supported by articulated standards to guide
20
future applications.

Although the Court has not adopted workable and generally applicable standards of implication, it has adopted various formulae to
support its decisions. In Rigsby the Court implied a private cause of

action to effectuate the purposes of the statute. Rigsby, the plaintiff,
brought an action for damages against his employer, under the Federal Safety Appliance Acts2 1 for injuries caused by a defect in one of
the grab-irons on a box car. The Federal Safety Appliance Acts re-

quired all cars to be equipped with ladders that have "secure handholds or grab-irons on their roofs at the tops of such ladders,"22 and
provided for criminal penalties in cases brought by the United States.

The Court stated that "disregard of the command of the statute is a
wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for

whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover
the damages from the party in default is implied."23 This formulation

might be labelled the tort theory of implication. 24 However, if the
tort theory of implication were applied in isolation, without considera18. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
19. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
20. For a thorough analysis of the development of the doctrine of implication, see
Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1392 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private Rights], where
the author argues that two criteria must be met before a court may imply a private cause
of action:
First, an implied private action must be consistent with the goals of the act in
question. Second, an action should be implied only when the enforcement
scheme adopted by Congress is found to be inadequate to attain Congress'
goals, and when a private action is thus needed to correct the inadequacy.
Id. at 1393.
See also Note, Implying Civil Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HARV.
L. REv. 285 (1963). But see Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Actions Under Federal
Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary? 43
FORDHAm L. REv. 441 (1974), arguing that consideration of the adequacy of the statutory enforcement scheme is of dubious validity because it is inconsistent with the separation of powers theory. A strict view of the separation of powers theory would invalidate the doctrine of implication since, once the court implies a cause of action, the
plaintiff enjoys a cause of action not created by the legislature.
21. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1976).

9. Id. § 11.
23.
24.

241 U.S. at 39.
See Private Rights, supra note 20, at 1394.
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tion of potential conflicts with the statute's goals or of the adequacy of
the statutory enforcement scheme, a private cause of action would be
implied under every federal statute.
In reaction to the broad scope of the Rigsby decision, lower
courts began to restrict the practice of implication. Some courts narrowly construed either the class of intended beneficiaries or the potential damage to the plaintiff covered by the relevant statute.25
Other courts rejected the applicability of implication because of the
view that new rights and new remedies must be created explicitly by
statute. 26 The standards governing implication became so restrictive
that an implied private cause of action was unavailable even if it were
consistent with the goals of the statute and the statutory enforcement
scheme were inadequate.
In its second approach to the issue of implication, the Supreme
Court itself moved to limit the broad standards enunciated in Rigsby.
In Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. North Western Public Service
Co.,27 the Court held that a lower court may not imply a private
cause of action granting retroactive relief where the agency entrusted
with the enforcement of a statute is limited to granting prospective
relief.28 In T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States,2 9 the Court added a
further limitation to the doctrine of implication by holding that when
a statute is divided into parts, each of which is intended to govern
the same basic conduct, and one part of the statute provides an express private remedy for a violation, a private cause of action will not
be implied for a violation of a part of the statute that contains no
express private remedy. 30
The third formula adopted by the Court to determine whether a
private cause of action should be implied was enunciated in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak. 3 1 Borak was an action brought by a stockholder of the
defendant charging deprivation of the shareholders' preemptive rights
by reason of a merger allegedly effected by the use of false and misleading proxy statements in violation of the Securities Exchange Act
25. Id. at 1394-95.
26. See, e.g., Acorn Iron & Supply Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 96 F. Supp. 481 (E.D.
Pa. 1951).
27. 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (Federal Power Act).
28. Id. at 251.
29. 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (Motor Carrier Act).
30. Id. at 470-78.
31. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See generally Comment, Private Rights From Federal Statutes: Toward a Rational Use of Borak, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 454 (1968).
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of 1934.32 The statute makes no provision for private actions, but the
Court held that a private cause of action should be implied,-" reasoning that the purpose of the statute was to protect investors like the
plaintiff, and that a private cause of action, supplementing Securities

and Exchange Commission (SEC) action, was necessary to effectuate
the congressional purpose.- 4 Although the Court considered the

adequacy of the statutory enforcement scheme, 35 it did not consider
whether an implied right would be inconsistent with the statute's

other goals. The other factor the Court considered, interest of and
harm to the plaintiff, adds little to a formulation of standards for implication because it speaks to the plaintiff's standing rather than the
36
availability of a cause of action.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
33. The Court said: "It appears clear that private parties have a right under § 27 to
bring suit for violation of § 14(a) of the Act." 377 U.S. at 430-31. Section 27, 15 U.S.C. §
78aa (1976), grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the statute and
suits brought to enforce the statute. There is both a conceptual and a practical difference between statutes creating federal court jurisdiction and those creating or supporting causes of action. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) (holding a complaint under
the fourth amendment stated a claim for purposes of jurisdiction but expressing no opinion whether it stated a cause of action); Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 3S8
(1971) (holding similar complaint did state cause of action and allowing damage remedy). See also Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality aud The
Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1958).
34. The Borak Court analyzed the purposes of § 14(a) and offered several reasons for
implying a cause of action in the face of an SEC enforcement scheme. 377 U.S. at
431-33. Accord, Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). The Allen Court
held that a private cause of action existed under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 197 3c (1976), because "the Act's laudable goal could be severely hampered...
if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of
the Attorney General." 393 U.S. at 556. For an SEC enforcement scheme that precludes
a private cause of action, see Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S.
412 (1975), disccussed at note 46 infra, in which Allen is distinguished.
35. 377 U.S. at 433-34. See Shelton & Berndt, Sex Discrimination in Vocational
Education: Title IX and Other Remedies, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1121, 1151 (1974), asserting
that the inadequacy of the statutory enforcement scheme is the most frequently successful basis for implying a private cause of action.
36. As with statutes creating jurisdiction and those creating causes of action, see note
33 supra, there is an obvious difference between standing and a private cause of action.
One may exist without the other. Recognition of this distinction explains the apparent
inconsistency between Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), and Borak, both
cases concerning an alleged private cause of action under § 14 of the Securities Exchange Act. For differing results under yet another section of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 compare Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972),
and Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), with
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (all
decided under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1976)). More-
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The Borak test generated renewed interest in finding potentially
conflicting statutory purposes in order to narrow the applicability of
Borak. In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association
of Railroad Passengers (Amtrak),3 7 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin Amtrak's termination of certain intercity lines. The district court dismissed
the action on the basis of plaintiffs' lack of standing; the court of appeals reversed. 38 In denying the plaintiffs a private cause of action, the

Supreme Court considered both the purpose of the statute and the
statutory enforcement scheme. It found that the Rail Passenger Service Act of 197039 was intended to create a swift, efficient method by

which uneconomical passenger services could be terminated without
the delays previously incurred by Interstate Commerce Commission

(ICC) or state regulatory commission review. However, the Court did
not consider the adequacy of the agency's swift, efficient enforce41
ment"0 nor the other purposes of the statute.

The most recent formulation of implication standards appeared in
Cort v. Ash, 42 where the Court enunciated a four-pronged test to

determine whether a court should imply a private cause of action.
The plaintiff, a shareholder, brought a derivative action for damages

and injunctive relief against the corporation's directors for allegedly
making unlawful contributions in violation of the Federal Election
Campaign Act. 43 Attempting to harmonize previous cases and formuover, standing has constitutional origins and causes of action do not. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogatefor Claim for Relief,

83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974); Private Rights, supra note 20, at 14 10-11.
37. 414 U.S. 453 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Amtrak].
38. The decision of the district court is unreported. The opinion of the court of appeals appears at 475 F.2d 325 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
39. 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1976) (Amtrak Act).
40. 414 U.S. at 466 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
41. Amtrak can be read as an unsuccessful attempt to seek judicial review of the
action of a private corporation acting as a federal agency because it was the administrative decision of Amtrak that the plaintiffs sought to overturn. However, the Amtrak statute gives the corporation unreviewable discretion to terminate services not part of the
basic system and undertaken on its own initiative. 45 U.S.C. § 564(b)(2) (1976). Amtrak
can also be read as an unsuccessful, poorly pleaded attempt at judicial review of the
Attorney General's failure to act. See 414 U.S. at 465 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Amtrak is distinguishable from other implication cases because Congress rejected a
proposal to allow "any person adversely affected or aggrieved" to bring suit under the
statute. 414 U.S. at 459-61.
42. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a discussion of the opinion of the court of appeals see
Private Rights, supra note 20. For general discussions of Cort see 25 CATl. U.L. REV.
447 (1976); 47 Miss. L.J. 156 (1976); 50 TUL. L. REV. 713 (1976).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976). The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (1976), increased the fines for violation of
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lations, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for a unanimous Court, declared that the following factors were relevant in the judicial implication of a private cause of action:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted"-that is, does the statute
create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is
there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such remedy for the plaintiff? And finally,
is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law
Applying this test to the facts in Cort, the Court found that none of
45
the requisite factors were present.
By asking if a private cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, the Court directed its attention to the potentially numerous goals of a statute4 6 but not to the
adequacy of the statutory enforcement scheme. 4 7 However, in applying the third prong of the test, the Court, citing Borak with approval, 48 recognized its duty to provide remedies that are necessary
to effectuate the legislative objective.
The weakness of the Cort test is its inquiry into legislative intent

§ 610,

changed many statutory definitions applicable to § 610, and vested exclusive

enforcement jurisdiction in the Federal Election Commission. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (1976).

The 1974 amendments were enacted after the decision by the court of appeals but before the decision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that the 1974 amendments precluded the requested prospective injunctive relief and then adopted the fourpronged test to deal with plaintiff's claim for damages.
44. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted).
45. The Court stated that although one purpose of the statute was to protect
shareholders, such as the plaintiff, this protection was a secondary concern. 422 U.S.
at 81.
46. As an example of the appropriate judicial inquiry for determining whether a
cause of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme, see
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 423 (1975), where the
Court held that only the SEC had been authorized by Congress to sue the SIPC to initiate the liquidation of failing brokerage firms. The purpose of the SIPC was to protect innocent investors, such as the plaintiff, whose cash was tied up in failing brokerage houses. However, the Court reasoned that if private parties were permitted to trigger
the machinery precipitous liquidations would be likely to result. 421 U.S. at 422.
47. The Cort test thus specifically includes one of the two criteria previously
suggested as essential to implying a private cause of action. See Pricate Rights, supra
note 20, at 1393.
48. 422 U.S. at 84. See discussion of Borak in text accompanying note 31 supra.
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to the extent that the focus is one of statutory construction or legislative history. The issue of implication does not arise if there is express
language prohibiting or granting a private cause of action. It is precisely because the legislature did not consider a private cause of action or thought it unnecessary at the time of a statute's enactment
that the issue of implication arises. Thus a careful examination of the
statute and its legislative history is unlikely to yield any insights for
those cases that raise a significant question of implication. However,
to the extent that the focus of the third prong of the Cort test is one
of statutory purpose the emphasis is correctly placed on an examina49
tion of the potentially conflicting goals of the statute.
IV.

LAU AND BAKKE

Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue
of implying a private cause of action under Titles VI and IX, two
cases could be read as tacit decisions of that question. In Lau v.
Nichols50 the plaintiffs, non-English speaking students of Chinese descent, brought a class action suit against the officials of their school
district, alleging violations of the fourteenth amendment and section
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While plaintiffs suggested no
particular remedy, they alleged that they were being denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in public school education because
they were non-English speaking and the classes were in English.
Both the district court 51 and the court of appeals 5 2 denied relief on
the merits of the claim, holding that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment or of Title VI.
The Supreme Court reversed but did not determine the appropriate relief.5 3 The Court stated: "We do not reach the Equal Protection Clause argument which has been advanced but rely solely on §
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to reverse the Court of Ap49. It is unclear whether the Court's decision will provide any predictability as
lower federal courts continue to decide private cause of action issues. For example, two
federal courts have reached opposite conclusions on the issue of whether there is a
private cause of action under a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap. Compare Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977),

with Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977). These cases are discussed in note 107 infra. See also cases cited in note 143 infra.
50. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
51. The opinion of the district court is unpublished.
52. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973).
53. 414 U.S. at 569. The Court did suggest alternative remedies. Id. at 565.
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peals."' i The defendants did not contest the plaintiffs' right to bring
an action under Title VI.
The argument that Lau recognizes a private cause of action
under Title VI is based on the language quoted above. Although the
plaintiffs raised violations of both the Constitution and the statute,
the Court specifically declined to base its decision on the Constitution. In order to rest the decision solely on the statute, the Court
implicitly determined that private individuals may bring an action
against a recipient of federal assistance under Title VI. 5
Similarly, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 56
the plaintiff brought an action in state court against the university
alleging a violation of the fourteenth amendment, section 601, and a
provision of the state constitution. Bakke alleged that he was denied
admission, solely on the basis of race, to the university's medical
school at Davis because of the operation of the defendant's voluntary
special minority admissions program.
The trial court agreed on the merits with Bakke and declared
that the special admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment, section 601, and the state constitution. 57 The California Supreme Court affirmed on the fourteenth amendment ground without
passing on the state constitutional or Title VI claims. 58 The parties
initially presented the issue in the United States Supreme Court in
terms of the fourteenth amendment. After oral argument, the Court
ordered supplemental briefs on the Title VI issues. 59
54. Id. at 566 (citation omitted).

55. For courts that adopt this view see cases cited at note 143 infra.
A majority of the Court in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978),
questioned the correctness of what appears to be the premise of the Lau decision.
Five justices were of the opinion that Title VI proscribes only that conduct which is
prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 4901, 4918. The other four justices disagreed.
Id. at 4935. Applying the majority's analysis of the scope of the statutory prohibitions
to the private cause of action issue, it is clear that a separate cause of action under the
statute would have little practical consequence.
56. 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
57. The trial court did not order Bakke's admission to the medical school since he
had not proven that he would have been admitted but for the special admissions program. On appeal the state supreme court held that the burden of proof on this issue was
the defendant's. The defendant conceded its inability to meet this burden and the state
supreme court ordered Bakke's admission. The United States Supreme Court affirmed
that part of the order admitting Bakke but reversed that part of the order prohibiting the
university from considering race as a factor in its admissions process.
58. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
59. 98 S. Ct. 293 (1977).
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Affirming in part and reversing in part, the closely divided Court
avoided the issue of whether a private cause of action may be implied
under Title VI. On the merits the Court held that the university's
special admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment and
Title VI but that the university could consider race as a factor in its
admissions decisions. Four Justices 60 voted to affirm the state court
decision on the sole basis that the special admissions program violated
Title VI. They stated that the private cause of action issue was not
properly before the Court since the university had first questioned
the availability of such an action in the Supreme Court.6 1 The four
Justices further stated that implication of a private cause of action
would be "in accord with the federal courts' consistent interpretation
of the Act." 62 Five Justices 63 reached their conclusions on the basis of
the fourteenth amendment and Title VI, reading the two provisions
as prohibiting essentially the same conduct. 6 4 Four of these Justices
stated that it was unnecessary to decide the private cause of action
issue but apparently assumed it for the purpose of the case. Mr. Justice White, in a separate opinion, addressed the private cause of action issue and determined that, consistent with the legislative purpose and history, one should not be inferred.6 5 Since Title VI formed
the basis of the decision for at least eight of the Justices, although
they reached different results on the merits of a violation, it is arguable that, as in Lau, a majority of the Court implicitly determined
that a private cause of action may be implied under Title VI.
It may be argued, however, that these cases do not determine
the private cause of action issue, because in each case there was a
coexistent remedy under section 1983, which provides a cause of action to redress deprivations "under color of state law" of rights se60. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart and Rehnquist concurred.
61. 98 S. Ct. at 2814.
62. Id.
63. Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion announcing the judgment of the Court.
Justices White, Blackmun, and Marshall wrote individual opinions and also joined with'
Justice Brennan in a joint opinion.
64. Justice Powell agreed with the Stevens plurality that the operation of the university's special admissions program illegally excluded Bakke on the basis of race. Justices
White, Blackmun, Marshall, and Brennan thought the special admissions program lawful. Justice Powell and these four Justices agreed that the university could lawfully
consider race in its admissions decision.
65. Justice White's approach reflects the principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius discussed in the text accompanying note 90 infra.
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cured by the federal "constitution or laws." 66 Since Title VI is a
"law," there may thus be a 1983 remedy for violation of the Title VI
duty if, as was the case in Lau and Bakke, the defendants' actions are

attributable to the state. Section 1983 does not apply to the nonstate
defendant, for example the private college, whose practices are not

"under color of state law." Accordingly, the Court's decisions in
L4(

and Bakke do not necessarily lead to a conclusion that there would be
a private remedy under Title VI alone. 67

It is clear that Lau and Bakke make implying a private cause of
action under Title VI irrelevant when there is state action. 68 How-

ever, it is not clear that the two cases resolve the complex policy
issues of implication or make judgments concerning tie intent of

Congress when private litigants seek to enforce Titles VI and LX
against private entities. The Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in Cannon v. University of Chicago,6 9 after its decision in
Bakke, is a further indication that Lau and Bakke are not determinative. 70
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (the statutory cause of action for constitutional viola-

tions). For courts that adopt this view see cases cited at note 143 infra.
67. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3799 (July 3, 1978) (No. 77-926) (see text accompanying notes 137 to 140
infra), the court rejected Lau as determinative, but partially on erroneous grounds.

The court appears to have relied on Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lau, 414
U.S. at 572, which states that the number of students affected is relevant to the appropriate remedy, for its decision that the number affected is relevant to the cause of
action and the substantive violation issues. 559 F.2d at 1072, 1033. Mthough the
number of beneficiaries affected by a recipient's discriminatory act may effect the potential remedies, the number is not relevant to the substantive violation. See Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (individual cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1982 (1976)); Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (individual cause of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976)). Titles VI and LX speak in terms of "no person." Although
there may be some logic to limiting private cause of action under Titles VI and IX to
class actions, classes may have less need of private actions than do individuals. It is
more likely that a discriminatory act against numerous beneficiaries will cause the federal agency to respond than will a discriminatory act against an individual. See text
accompanying notes 151 & 152 infra.
68. See, e.g., Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967) (alleging violation under Title VI of right to attend desegregated schools); Blackshear Residents Organization v. Housing Auth., 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (alleging
violation under Title VI of right to desegregated public housing). See also Laufinan v.
Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Gautreaux v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill.
1967).
69. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3799 (July 3, 1978) (No.
77-926).
70. Whatever the implications of Lau and Bakke for Title VI, the same would be true
for Title IX. The prohibitions and enforcement schemes are nearly identical; the only
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TO TITLES VI AND XI

A. Especial Benefit or Zone of Interest
The first prong of the test formulated by the Supreme Court in
Cort v. Ash 7 ' to determine whether a private cause of action should
be implied is to determine if the statute creates a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff; that is, is the plaintiff one of a class for whose
"especial" benefit the statute was enacted? 72 The federal right prong
of the Cort test simply recognizes that the "where there is a wrong,
there is a remedy" theory of Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Rigsby 7 3 is a necessary factor but is not alone sufficient for judicial implication. Virtually any statute can be read to embrace the plaintiff
as an intended beneficiary. 74 The rare case that involves a statute
under which the plaintiff receives no arguable benefit, protection, or
right will be ousted from federal court under the familiar principles of
standing. Other cases, like Cort v. Ash, that involve statutes under
which the plaintiff's benefits, protections, and rights are subordinate
to the main purpose of the statute, will be decided according to the
other elements of the Cort test.
Title VI and Title IX are designed to protect individuals from
unlawful discrimination. The language of both statutes expressly for75
bids particular class based discrimination against any individual. It
is arguable that Congress had an additional purpose in enacting Titles
VI and IX; that is, to restrict the potential uses of federal monies. In
enacting Titles VI and IX Congress declared its intent to support various programs and activities and by negative implication its desire not
to support racially and sexually discriminatory programs or activimportant difference is that Title VI contains a provision expressly limiting the coverage
of employment matters. 42 U.S.C. § 20OO0d-3 (1976). See note 92 infra.
71. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
72. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
73. 241 U.S. 33 (1916), discussed in text accompanying notes 21 to 24 supra.

74. In cases denying as well as allowing a private cause of action courts have not
disputed plaintiffs' allegations that they are intended beneficiaries of the statute In
question. See Securities Investors Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975)
(investors); Allen v. State Bd. of Election, 393 U.S. 544, 548, 556 (1969) (voters); J.I.
Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (investors). Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 61, 81
(1975) (stockholders); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of RR. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453, 461 (1974) (passengers). See also Cannon v. University

of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977), discussed in text accompanying notes 137
to 140 infra.

75. Section 601 of Title VI and § 901 of Title IX provide that "no person" shall be
subject to discrimination.
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ities. 76 These purposes are consistent and mutually supportive. The
statutes require agencies to attempt to bring recipients into compliance voluntarily. 7 7 This route is preferred over the explicitly authorized statutory remedy of termination of federal financial assis78
tance.
B. Legislative Intent
The second prong of the Cort v. Ash test focuses on whether

there is evidence of a legislative intent to create or deny a private
cause of action. To the extent this factor looks for legislative intent in
the four comers of the statute or in the legislative history, the search

is probably a futile one. 79 The language of Titles VI and IX and their

legislative histories are bereft of a clear indication of legislative intent

to create or deny a private cause of action. While the statutes do set
up administrative enforcement mechanisms, they do not specify that

this method of enforcement is exclusive.8 0
The legislative histories of Titles VI and IX are equally inconclu76. Before the enactment of Title VI, the question of whether to condition a grant of
federal assistance on a policy of nondiscrimination arose under each specific funding
act. The civil rights issue rather than the merit of the funding program became the focus
of debate. A desire on the part of the sponsors of Title VI to sever the civil rights issue
and settle it was at least one motivation for the introduction of Title VI. See, e.g., 110
CONG. REc. 6544, 6561, 7061 (1964).
There is some support for the notion that Congress is required to condition federal
assistance on a policy of nondiscrimination. If such condition did not attach, the federal government would be in the position of sponsoring discrimination in violation of
the fifth amendment due process guarantees. See McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp.
448 (D.D.C. 1972), (Secretary of the Treasury may not allow charitable deductions for
gifts to fraternal orders that exclude nonwhites and may not grant federal income tax
exemptions to such organizations). But cf. Stewart v. New York Univ., No. 74 Civ. 4126
(S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1976) (federal financial assistance too minimal for constitution or
Title IX to apply).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
78. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), the United
States asserted that Title VI was designed to end discrimination, not simply to allocate
federal money to programs that did not discriminate. United States Supplemental Brief
for Amicus Curiae at 28-29.
Citations to the legislative history of Titles VI and LX are given in note 81 infra.
These statutes are more analogous to the Voting Rights Act discussed in Allen v. State
Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), than to the Federal Election Act discussed in Cort
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
79. See discussion in text accompanying note 49 supra.
80. Whether a court should infer that the administrative remedy is exclusive is considered in the context of the third prong of the Cort test. See text accompanying note
121 infra.
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sive. 81 Title VI was enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the first comprehensive civil rights statute since the Reconstruction
period. The 1964 Act prohibits racial discrimination in public accommodations, 8 2 in public facilities, 8 3 and in voting; 84 authorizes the
Attorney General to initiate and to intervene in school desegregation
suits; 85 and prohibits race and sex discrimination in employment.,,
87
One part of the 1964 Act specifically authorizes individual suits,
another combines individual suits and administrative procedures, 8 8

and another only specifies administrative enforcement. 89 If the private cause of action issue were considered in the context of the entire
1964 Act, the familiar principle of expressio unitts est exclusio alterius
would militate against such private actions. The explicit provision for
private suits in some parts of the Act and the omission of a specific
provision in others can be viewed as "evidence" of a congressional
intent to deny a private cause of action under Title VI. 90
Title IX was first introduced in the House of Representatives as
proposed Title X of the Higher Education Act of 1971 and charac81. For an overview see [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2462 (Title IX);
[1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355 (Title VI).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976) (Title II).
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000b to 2000b-3 (1976) (Title III).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1976) (Title I).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1976) (Title IV). The same statute that enacted the provisions of Title IX also amended Title IV to prohibit segregation on the basis of sex. Act
of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(a), 86 Stat. 375 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2
000c (1976)).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976) (Title VII).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1976) (public accommodations).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (employment).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976) (federally assisted programs).
90. This was the position taken by the university in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). Supplemental Brief for Petitioner at 20-22.
This notion is derived from an extension of the holdings of T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United
States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959), Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co.,
341 U.S. 246 (1951), discussed in text accompanying notes 27-30 supra, and Switchmen's
Union v. Union Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943). In these cases the Court interpreted
the relevant statutes as prohibiting a cause of action because of a specific grant in one
section and the failure to provide for a cause of action in the section under which these
cases were brought. However, these statutes, Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. H9
1-327 (1976), Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-825r (1976), and Railway Labor Act,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-161 (1976), are comprehensive, integrated statutes, each under the regulatory authority of a particular agency. In contrast, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 more
closely resembles an omnibus bill considered as a legislative package because the central issue was outlawing racial discrimination. In the Civil Rights Act, the subject matter
of each title is different, the prohibitions are directed to different entities, and the enforcement agencies are separate.
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terized as an amendment to Title VII.91 In 1972 the House passed a
version that contained, among the provisions that eventually became
sections 901-903: (1)An exemption for employment practices identical
to section 604 of Title VI;9 2 (2) a section extending the coverage of

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196493 to educational institutions;
and (3) a section repealing the exemption for executive, administrative, and professional personnel previously contained in the Equal
Pay Act. 94 The version of Title IX that passed both Houses of Congress contained the latter two provisions. Because the provision parallel to section 604 was inconsistent with the latter two provisions, it
was dropped from the bill.
At the same time Congress was considering Title IX,with its
sections relating to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, Congress was
also considering the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 9"
which contained an amendment to Title VII similar to that contained
in Title IX. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act was enacted
while the conference committee was working on Title IX.The duplicative amendment to Title VII was then removed from Title IX.
Although this legislative history is particularly illustrative of Congress'
intent to proscribe employment discrimination in federally assisted
education programs, 96 it is unclear whether it is evidence of congressional intent to create or deny a private cause of action. It could be
argued that because Congress expressly authorized a private cause of
91. 117 CONG. REc. 9822 (1971).
92. Section 604 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976), expressly limits the coverage
of employment discrimination to those instances "where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." Case law has held that employment
discrimination is also covered by the prohibitions of Title VI to the extent that discrimination against employees constitutes discrimination against students or other beneficiaries, such as patients or welfare applicants. See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
Title IX has no provision parallel to § 604.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-15 (1976). Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin.
94. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). The 1972 amendment is reflected in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)
(1976).
95. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
96. Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (employment discrimination suit maintainable against museum as educational activity receiving federal funds). But see Romeo Community Schools, 14 Fair Empi. Prac. Cas.
1177 (E.D. Mich. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-1692 (6th Cir. Nov. 16, 1977) (HEW
regulations governing school teachers' pregnancy leave not in furtherance of legislative
purpose of Title IX); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8241 (W.D. Wash.
1978) (HEW general employment regulations for a university beyond the scope of Title
IX).
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action under Title VII, the concomitant failure to provide for a private cause of action under Title IX is determinative of Congress' intent to deny such an action. 97 On the other hand, since the provisions that eventually became Title IX were during most of their
legislative history considered at the same time Congress was considering an amendment to Title VII, one could argue that a private cause
of action should be implied because one is provided by Title VII. In
all likelihood neither of these views of the legislative history is accurate. More probably, the legislative history tells us that Congress
simply did not consider whether there should be a private cause of
action under Title IX.
Another indication of legislative intent may be found in the arguably self-executing nature of Title VI's section 601 and Title IX's section 901. The effective date of these sections was not tied to the publication of final regulations authorized under sections 602 and 902.
Although the Title VI regulations were published only six months
after the passage of the statute, 98 more than three years elapsed before HEW issued its Title IX regulations in final form. 99 Congress
made several exceptions to the prohibitions of section 901; in one
such exception that postpones the applicability of section 901 the time
runs from the effective date of Title IX.10 ° Although the persuasiveness of this minor point of statutory construction is not compelling, it
does indicate that Congress did not consider the effective date of the
prohibitory language to be tied to the promulgation of agency regulations. Under this construction, immediate compliance with section
901 by recipients of federal financial assistance was mandated, even
before clarification by the federal agencies of close or unsettled questions of sex discrimination. It is likely that an aggrieved individual
could have successfully petitioned for a federal court order mandating
a recipient's compliance during the interim period.101
97.

See note 90 supra.

98. 29 Fed. Reg. 16298 (1964).
99. 40 Fed. Reg. 24128 (1975).
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2) (1976) provides that, in the case of an educational institu-

tion that has begun the process of changing, under a plan approved by the Commissioner of Education, from an institution that admits only students of one sex to an Institution that admits students of both sexes, the prohibitions of § 1681(a) (§ 901) shall
not apply for six years after June 23, 1972, or for seven years from the date the educational institution begins the process, whichever is later.
101. A violation of § 901 could have been established under principles enunciated In
cases decided under other sex discrimination statutes or constitutional provisions.
Asserting that § 901 is self-executing is not necessarily inconsistent with the notion
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That sections 601 and 901 may be self-executing is also supported
by a similar statute (section 504) outlawing discrimination on the basis
of handicap in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance. 10 2 As part of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress did
not enact a provision parallel to Title VI's section 602 or to Title IX's
section 902. However, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation
Act Amendments of 1974 indicates that Congress intended the enforcement of section 504 to parallel that of Titles VI and LX. 0 Thus
the provisions of sections 602, 902, or a hypothetical 505 were not
seen as essential to the enforcement of the nondiscrimination sections.
Since Congress patterned section 504 on sections 601 and 901
and intended the enforcement of the three sections to be parallel,
cases interpreting section 504 in terms of a private cause of action are
also useful in determining the legislative intent of Congress to create
or deny a private right to sue under sections 601 and 901. In Lloyd v.
Regional Transportation Authority 04 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit concluded that a private cause of action should be
implied under section 504. Plaintiffs brought a class action against
municipal defendants claiming that their refusal to make the federally
funded public transportation system accessible to plaintiffs violated
several statutes, including section 504. Applying the four pronged test
of Cort v. Ash, the court of appeals concluded that section 504 implicitly provides a private cause of action. However, the court did not
reach the question of whether the implied cause of action would continue once a "meaningful administrative enforcement mechanism" had
that the regulations under Title IX (and Title VI) are substantive or legislative rules that
have the force of law rather than interpretive rules. The difference between interpretive
and legislative rules stems from the authority given to the agency by Congress rather
than the interpretive or legislative nature or quality of the regulation. See generally
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Decelopment of Administrative Policy, 78 HAnv. L. REv. 921 (1965).
102. Act of Sept. 26, 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) [hereinafter cited as § 504].
103. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NE.ws 6373, 6390-91. There was at least one attempt to include the prohibitions of § 504 in Title VI. 119 Cong. Rec. 7114 (1973).
HEW has been designated as the coordinating agency. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3
C.F.R. 117 (1976 Compilation). HEW issued final regulations on May 4, 1977, 42 Fed.
Reg. 22676 (1977) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 et seq.), and other agencies' regulations will be forthcoming. Executive Order No. 11,914 also authorizes federal agencies
to adopt rules, regulations, and orders to ensure that recipients comply with § 504. Although the Executive order is intended to supply the missing analogue to §§ 602 and 902,
it is doubtful that it can authorize legislative rulemaking, for this authorization power
belongs to Congress. See Shapiro, supra note 101.
104. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
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been implemented under section 504.105 In applying the second
prong of the Cort test the court quoted from the legislative history of
the 1974 Amendments: "This approach to implementation of section
504, which closely follows the models of the above cited antidiscrimination provisions [sections 601 and 901], would . . . permit a judicial
remedy through a private action."106 Thus, section 504, the cases decided under it, and Congress' conscious parallelism in sections 601,
901, and 504 provide some indication of legislative intent to create a
7
10
private cause of action.

105. 548 F.2d at 1286 n.29. Lloyd was decided after HEW published its proposed
regulation implementing § 504, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,548 (1976), but before the final one was
issued in May 1977. Whether the "meaningful administrative enforcement mechanism"
is a separate basis of the court's decision must now be determined since there is a final
regulation implementing § 504. See text accompanying note 144 infra.
106. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390-91, as cited in 548 F.2d at
1286 (emphasis added by court of appeals). The court continued: "While the above
language contemplates judicial review of an administrative proceeding as contradistinet
from an independent cause of action in federal court, still it is plain that the rights of
the handicapped were meant to be enforced at some point through the vehicle of a
private cause of action." First, it is not apparent that the court's limitation Is correct.
Second, the allegedly aggrieved individual will not be a party at any administrative
proceeding to determine the compliance of a recipient. 45 C.F.R. § 81.23 (1977), incorporated by reference in 45 C.F.R. § 86.61 (1977). Thus the individual's attempt to obtain
judicial review of the agency's action may be limited and in any event will depend on
the agency's initiative. See note 119 infra. "Private cause of action" as used In this
article does not mean the right to seek judicial review of agency action but rather the
right to initiate action in federal court on one's own. The importance of this distinction
is rooted in the belief of many intended beneficiaries of §§ 601, 901, and 504 that the
federal agencies responsible for enforcement cannot and will not be effective in enforcement, rather than a concern that the agencies will err in termination proceeding
decisions. See text accompanying note 144 infra.
107. For other cases construing § 504 see, e.g., Barnes v. Converse College, No.
77-116 (D.S.C. July 18, 1977); Bartels v. Biernot, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wise. 1977)
(private cause of action under § 504 on the basis of Lloyd; no discussion of the effect of
the 504 regulation which was issued before the decision); Duran v. City of Tampa, 430
F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (private cause of action under § 504 but insufficient Irreparable harm for preliminary injunction); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190
(N.D.W. Va. 1976) (exclusion of prisoner from vocational rehabilitation program because
of alleged mental impairment violation of § 504); Curmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp,
982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977) (refusal to hire blind teacher
violation of fourteenth amendment due process clause; court did not reach § 504 issue
because refusal to hire predated effective date of statute). In Drennon v. Philadelphia
Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977), the court held that plaintiff had a private
cause of action under §§ 504 and 503 (similar statute that requires nondiscrimination in
employment by federal contractors) but stayed any action until plaintiff had exhausted
available remedies under § 503, which is administered by the Department of Labor. Cf.
Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (denying a private cause of
action under § 503). See generally Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501 (1973).
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Another indication of legislative intent drawn from legislative action taken since the enactment of sections 601 and 901 is the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act.' 0 8 This 1976 law authorizes courts
to grant to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee in any
action to enforce specifically identified civil rights laws, including
Titles VI and IX. It is clear from the statute and the congressional
debates that the Attorneys' Fees Act does not create new remedies
but rather lends assistance to the private enforcement of rights already authorized under existing civil rights laws. 1°9 Supporters of the
bill assumed that a private cause of action existed under Titles VrI and
IX, and the purpose of the bill was to encourage vindication of individual rights by individuals bringing suit."10
As always there is some legislative history that points to the opposite conclusion, that no private cause of action already existed. In
the House, Representative Quie (R-Minn.) questioned if a private
cause of action existed under Title IX. In response several representatives referred to Cannon v. University of Chicago"' which held that
no such cause of action should be implied.112 On rehearing, the Can-

non court, ignoring the equally clear indications of other representatives and senators, 1 3 found the above colloquy dispositive of Con14
gress' intent not to allow a private cause of action under Title LX.1
Yet the representatives who had discussed Cannon had not embraced
the court's interpretation of legislative intent but rather had noted
that the legislative history was ambiguous.
If Congress did not intend private causes of action to be available
108. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19S8).
109. See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. S16,251 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Scott); 192 Cong. Rec. S16,252 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
110. See, e.g., 122 Cong. Rec. S17,051-52 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (remarks of Sen.
Tunney & Sen. Abourezk); 122 Cong. Rec. H12,159, H12,16'-64 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976)
(remarks of Reps. Drinan, Kastenmeir, Fish, & Holtzman).
111. 406 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1976), affd, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977). Cannon
is discussed in text accompanying notes 137 to 140 infra.
112. 122 Cong. Rec. H12,161 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). This debate occurred after the
initial decision of the court of appeals but before the court granted rehearing, Nov. 30,
1976, or decided the rehearing issue, Aug. 9, 1977.
113. E.g., 122 Cong. Rec. S16,252 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy):
Inclusion of cases brought under Title LX would mean that where educational
programs which receive Federal financial assistance discriminate on the basis
of sex .... courts would be able to make discretionary awards of attorneys' fees
to successful litigants in order to assist private enforcement efforts in this crucial area of the law.
114. 559 F.2d at 1079-80.
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under Titles VI and IX, there does not appear to be any purpose in
including the statutes within the scope of the Attorneys' Fees Act.
The court of appeals in Cannon embraced the defendants' argument
that the statutes were incorporated into the Attorneys' Fees Act to
cover the situation that would arise should a future court imply a
private right to bring suit. 115 However, the court's statement that

Congress simply could have been providing for the contingency that
future court decisions might imply a private right of action from the
provisions of Title IX116 suggests that judicial rather than congres-

sional intention is dispositive.
The defendants in Cannon also argued that Titles VI and IX
were included in the Attorneys' Fees Act to cover those situations in
which an allegedly aggrieved individual seeks judicial review under
section 603 or 903117 of an administrative determination that the state
agency had complied with the statutory antidiscrimination provisions.11 However, it is not clear that an allegedly aggrieved individual may seek judicial review under sections 603 and 903119 or that
115. 559 F.2d at 1078-80.
116. Id. at 1080.
117. Section 903, 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976), provides:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 1682 of this title

shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law
for similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the
case of action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing
to grant or to continue financial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply
with any requirement imposed pursuant to section 1682 of this title, any person
aggrieved (including any State or political subdivision thereof and any agency
of either) may obtain judicial review of such action in accordance with chapter
7 of Title 5, and such action shall not be deemed committed to unreviewable
agency discretion within the meaning of section 701 of that title.
Section 603, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) is identical, substituting § 2000d-1 for § 1682.
118. Administrative determinations are required to be made at a hearing. 42 U.S.C. 9
2000d-1 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
119. See 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976), quoted in note 117 supra. The first sentence provides judicial review under specific funding statutes. E.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 241K, 585, 869a
(1976). The second sentence provides judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976). Section 1683 limits APA review to findings of
noncompliance which result in termination of funds. The victims of race and sex discrimination are not likely to seek judicial review of termination orders, but rather of
determinations of compliance with no resulting termination order. Thus the question of
an individual's right to judicial review will depend on his or her ability to comply with
the two part standing test of Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The second part,
whether the plaintiff is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question, can be satisfied by individuals
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such judicial review would be the kind of private enforcement of
rights contemplated by the Attorneys' Fees Act. 120
In summary, evidence of a legislative intent to create or deny a
private cause of action is inconclusive. Clearly, no provision in the
statute or in its legislative history specifically denies a private cause of
action. Indeed, the legislative history indicates a congressional intent
to end discrimination, preferably through voluntary compliance.
However, under the Cort test, legislative intent alone is not determinative of the private cause of action issue.
C. Consistency With Statutory Purpose
The third prong of the Cort v. Ash' 2 1 test focuses on whether an
implied private cause of action is consistent wvith the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme. In Cort the Supreme Court held that
implying a private cause of action in favor of the plaintiff shareholder
was not consistent with the perceived purpose of the Federal Election Campaign Act:
alleging they are victims of discrimination. See text accompanying note 75 supra. However, individuals may have difficulty with the first part, injury in fact, especially in light
of the causation test announced in Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization,
426 U.S. 26 (1976). If the individuals allegedly remain subject to discrimination while
federal financial assistance continues to programs and activities covered by Titles VI
and IX, they will no doubt be affronted by the federal agency's action, or lack of action.
However, termination, the remedy available to the agency, may not ensure that the
recipient ceases the discrimination.
The few cases that discuss an individual's right to judicial review under § 2000d-2 or
§ 1683 do not clarify the standing issue. Some cases discuss an intended beneficiary's
right to sue a federal agency for failure to enforce the statute in terms of standing.
Compare Green St. Ass'n v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 932
(1967), Hardy v. Leonard, 377 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1974), and SCLC, Inc. v. Connolly, 331 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Mich. 1971), with Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973), and Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D.D.C. 1976). Other
cases discuss standing where the issue is whether communities may negate settlement
agreements between recipients and the federal agency reached during compliance proceedings. Taylor v. Cohen, 405 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968); Linker v. Unified School Dist.
#259, 344 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Kan. 1972). Taylor and Linker questioned parents' standing
in school desegregation cases, but the courts denied review on the basis of lack of a
final termination order. Still other cases discuss standing in situations raising the issue
of this article, private causes of action. See cases cited at note 143 infra. It is often
necessary to distinguish between standing to review administrative determinations
under §§ 603 or 903 and standing to initiate litigation for damages or equitable relief, or
between individuals suing federal agencies and those suing recipients. See discussion
in note 5 supra. Unfortunately, courts often fail to do so.
120. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
121. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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Recovery of derivative damages by the corporation for violation of § 610 would not cure the influence which the use of
corporate funds in the first instance may have had on a federal election. Rather, such a remedy would only permit directors in effect to "borrow" corporate funds for a time; the
later compelled repayment might well not deter the initial
violation, and would certainly not decrease the impact of the
1 22
use of such funds upon an election already past.
In Amtrak 123 the legislative scheme involved such integrated control over the railroad system that a decision concerning one line would
affect another line. The Court in Amtrak and Cort properly focused
on the diverse goals of the relevant statutes and concluded that implying a private cause of action would undermine the primary goals
of the respective statutes.
The policies underlying Titles VI and IX, differ from the statutory objectives considered in Cort and Amtrak. The primary goal of
Titles VI and IX is to end discrimination in federally assisted programs and activities. However, the administration of the statutes does
not involve the federal funding agency in the day to day decisions of
the recipients. 124 The administrative enforcement mechanism set up
by the statutes is designed to provide the recipient with a fair and
impartial procedure when the termination of funding is proposed because of the absence of voluntary compliance with the statutes' antidiscrimination provisions. An implied private cause of action would
not appear to undermine these goals.
Titles VI and IX are more analogous to the Voting Rights Act of
1965 at issue in Allen v. State Board of Elections. 1 25 The primary purpose of the voting statute was to ensure blacks their right to vote.
The administrative mechanism drafted recognized the states' interest
in determining voter qualifications and standards. In Allen, the Court
held that a private cause of action would not interfere with the Attor122. Id. at 84.
123. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
124. The extent of federal regulation is a factor also considered by courts and commentators in the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which determines
whether a court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has acted. In the same way that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is concerned with the allocation of power and authority between the courts and administrative
agencies so too is the third prong of the Cort test. See generally L. JAFFEE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 121-51 (1965).
125. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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ney General's duties under the statute and was
not otherwise incon26
sistent with the general statutory objectives. 1
Cases arising under the Hill-Burton Act 1 2 7 are also instructive.

Under the Hill-Burton Act a state must adhere to certain general
regulations prescribed by the Surgeon General1' 8 to quali6, for federal hospital construction funds. The statute further requires a state
plan that provides for adequate hospitals and medical services for
those unable to pay for such services.' 29 In Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital 30 the plaintiff sued to compel the defendant hospital to
provide a reasonable volume of services for those unable to pay. The
court implied a private cause of action. Relying on Gomez c. Florida
State Employment Service' 3 ' which allowed a private cause of action
under the Wagner-Peyser Act, a similarly administered statute, the
court reasoned it was consistent with the Act's purpose to allow a
private beneficiary of the statute to enforce those requirements upon
1 32
which the extension of federal financial assistance was conditioned.
126. Id. at 556-57.

127. 42 U.S.C. § 291-291o (1976).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 291c, 291d (1976). This function was transferred to the Secretary of
HEW in 1966, Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, 3 C.F.R. 1023 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1976); 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(b) (1976).
130. 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970).
131. 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969). In Gomez migratory farm workers brought a private cause of action to enforce the Wagner-Peyser Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 49-49k (1976).
which provides that for a state to receive federal financial assistance for public employment offices the state must comply with certain conditions. Statutory enforcement provides for termination of assistance. In allowing die workers to sue, the court stated: "It
is unthinking that Congress, obviously concerned with people, would have left the Secretary with only the sanction of cutting off funds to the state. Moreover, the private civil
remedy is a method of policy enforcement long honored ....
"417 F.2d at 576.
Under the Gomez rationale a private litigant could sue to enforce the regulations issued under Title VI and IX and attack violations such as the failure to establish a grievance procedure, 45 C.F.R. § 86.8 (1977), or the failure to complete a self-evaluation, 45
C.F.R. § 86.3(c) (1977), rather than simply seeking to enforce the prohibitions of §§ 601
and 901.
132. Accord, Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Organized Migrants
in Community Action, Inc. v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla.
1971). But cf. Stanturf v. Sipes, 924 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963), afrd, 335 F 2d 224
(8th Cir. 1964) (no private cause of action for damages for failure to comply with reasonable volume of services requirement). See also Poirrier v. St. James Parish Police Jury,
372 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1974), allowing a private suit against the hospital and HEW
to compel the opening of a hospital built with Hill-Burton funds. In Poirrierthe court
treats the case as a review of agency action (or inaction) and holds that HEW is obligated to do something to enforce the Hill-Burton Act. Poirrier, like Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and thus involves the right of an individual
to sue a federal agency for enforcement. See note 119 supra.
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It has been suggested that cases such as Cook are bottomed on a
third party beneficiary contract theory. 133 Under this theory the federal program is viewed as a contract between the federal government
and a designated state agency and recipient hospital under which federal financial assistance is provided in return for state and hospital
compliance with certain conditions, in this case a reasonable volume
of services for those unable to pay. Indigent patients are viewed as
intended third party beneficiaries who may sue to enforce their rights
under the contract. The remedy prescribed by the statute for a hospital's "breach of contract" is the suspension of federal assistance until
the hospital complies with the statutory conditions or makes restitution to the federal government. 134 However, indigent patients are not
compensated by such a suspension for they are still denied services.
A private cause of action complements rather than contradicts the
statutory purpose of providing federal funds in return for state and
hospital compliance with statutorily imposed conditions. 135
Whether the third party beneficiary theory is a separate basis for
allowing private causes of action or merely a description and application of the Cort test is probably irrelevant. In either case the statutory purpose and scheme of Titles VI and IX are analogous to those of
the Hill-Burton Act. Federal financial assistance is authorized and extended to states and other entities in return for the recipient's compliance with certain conditions. In the case of Titles VI and IX that
condition is nondiscrimination.13 6 Allowing a private beneficiary of Ti133.

See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 n.2 (1974) (Stewart, J., concurring); Bos-

sier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911
(1967) (Title VI); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 223
(1976).

134. 42 U.S.C. § 291g (1976). This provision is similar to § 602 of Title VI and § 902
of Title IX.
135. Arguably to allow an individual suit seeking termination of federal financial
assistance to a noncomplying recipient would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the statutory scheme. However, individuals who attempt private causes of action
typically do not seek termination but rather injunctive or declaratory relief. See Hardy v.
Leonard, 377 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (question of private termination specifically
left open); Stanturf v. Sipes, 224 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Mo. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 224 (8th
Cir. 1964) (damages sought).
136. The same third party beneficiary theory would seem to support a private cause
of abtion under Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation), as amended
by 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), and at
least one district court has so held. See Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp.
684 (N.D. Cal. 1974). The majority of cases hold that there is no private cause of action
by the alleged victim against the contractor, usually on the same grounds as stated in
Cannon, inconsistency with statutory purpose and adequacy of administrative enforcement. See, e.g., Lewis v. FMC Corp., 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1975);
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ties VI and IX to enforce that condition would appear to complement
rather than interfere with the express remedy for disputes between
the federal government and the recipient of federal funds.
In Cannon v. University of Chicago' 3 7 however, the court found

that an implied private cause of action would be inconsistent with the
underlying legislative purpose of Title LX. In Cannon, the plaintiff
sued the University of Chicago and Northwestern University alleging
sex discrimination in the schools' denial of her application to medical
school. 138 The court viewed HEW's argument that a private cause of
action would be a useful means of enforcing the statutory policy 39 as
begging the question, and focused instead on the existence of an administrative forum in which to raise complaints. The court concluded
that "it -was Congress's purpose to commit the screening of Title LX
complaints to the administrative agencies charged with the responsibility of overseeing federally funded educational programs and to encourage resolution of those complaints by means of agency conciliation efforts directed at achieving voluntary compliance with the
statutory prohibition."' 40
Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1974). To the extent that the

arguments made in terms of Titles VI and IX are criticisms of the courts' articulation of
the criteria for implying a private cause of action, the same arguments can be applied to
the Executive order. However, there are more difficult problems under the Executive
order. The basic support for the practice of implication comes from the fact that courts
interpret the intention of Congress and are careful not to interfere with the stated goals
of the statute or to allow unnecessary remedies. Moreover, Congress is free to amend a
statute to correct the erroneous implication of a private cause of action. Thus the source
of the cause of action is still in Congress' realm. In the case of an Executive order a
court does not look at the intent of Congress but rather of the President. To allow the
President to regulate the jurisdiction and business of the federal courts raises serious
constitutional questions under Article III. See Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F.
Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (denying a cause of action under the Executive order). The
same constitutional issue is not raised in the case of a private action against a governmental agency to compel enforcement of the Executive order. See Legal Aid Soc'y of
Alameda County v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
137. 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977).
138. The plaintiff's primary allegation was that the preference given to younger candidates was discriminatory on the basis of sex since the age preference has an adverse
impact on women and has not been validated. It is apparent from the court's statement
of facts that it saw little merit in the plaintiff's substantive claim. Id. at 1067.
139. HEW was originally a defendant since the plaintiff also alleged that HEW had
failed in its duty to investigate her administrative complaint. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint against HEW on the ground that
HEW was actively investigating the complaint. On the issue of a private cause of action
HEW first argued in the court of appeals that no such right existed. However, HEW
later supported plaintiff's petition for rehearing and filed a brief on the issue. The brief
does not give a reason for the change in the agency's position. Id. at 1080.
140. Id. at 1081.
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However, Congress did not commit the screening of complaints
to HEW or any other agency; HEW chose to adopt a complaint procedure in its regulations. 14 1 In addition, it was HEW and not Congress that chose to encourage informal resolution of complaints. Congress set up an administrative mechanism and required attempts at
voluntary compliance for resolution of disputes between federal funding agencies and the recipient before there could be a government
termination of funds. However, as noted in connection with the
Hill-Burton cases, 14 2 a statutory remedy for disputes between a government agency and a recipient of federal financial assistance is not
inconsistent with a separate private remedy for an intended ben43
eficiary of the statute.'1
In determining whether an implied private cause of action under

Titles VI and IX is consistent with the underlying purpose of the
statutes, courts should consider the adequacy of statutory enforcement. While the Cort test does not specify an adequacy test as a
separate factor, the language of the Supreme Court and cases cited in
141. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7, 86.71 (1976). A proposed change in the procedures is discussed at note 13 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 127 to 132 supra.
143. Several cases have held that there is a private cause of action under Titles VI
and IX, but the courts did not discuss the basis for their decisions. See McCarthy v.
Burkholder, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 682 (D. Kan. 1977) (Title IX); Flanagan v. President of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976) (Title VI); Trent v. Perritt, 391 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Miss. 1975) (Title IX); Hawthorne v. Kenbridge Recreation
Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Va. 1972) (Title VI). Other cases, relying on Cannon,
hold there is not a private cause of action under Titles VI and IX. Lodwig v. Board of
Educ., No. C-76-604 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-3375 (6th Cir.
July 20, 1977) (Title IX, student); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n,
424 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.
1977) (challenge to separate rules for girls basketball not entitled to relief under Title
IX); Leake v. University of Cincinnati, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (no
private cause of action under Title IX to challenge alleged sex discrimination in hiring
practices for professors), appeal docketed, No. 76-2430 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1976) (Title IX);
Stewart v. New York Univ., No. 74 Civ. 4126 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1976) (no private cause
of action under Titles VI or IX because amount of federal financial assistance and degree of government involvement is too minimal).
In Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779 (N.D. Ohio 1976), the court
addressed the issue and specifically held there was a private cause of action under Title
IX. Applying the Cort v. Ash test, the court rejected the argument that the administrative remedy of § 902 was exclusive and discussed the need for a private cause of action:
"Individual litigants who suffered from non-employment related sex discrimination
which violated the express prohibitions of § 1681(a), would be left with no remedy for
the personal injury which they suffered to their education." Id. at 781 n.1. The impact
of Piascik is limited since the plaintiff also alleged a cause of action under Title VII and
did not prevail on the merits.
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support of the third prong of its test suggest that consideration of the
enforcement mechanism is appropriate.144

While it is difficult to measure objectively compliance with Titles
VI and IX, 1 4 5 several facts point to the inadequacy of administrative
enforcement. First, HEW, the major funding source of educational
programs and activities, has a significant backlog of uninvestigated

and unresolved sex discrimination complaints.' 46 In addition, other
agencies that also fund educational programs and activities have not
promulgated regulations effectuating section 901 of Title LX.14 7 The
backlog of complaints has so impaired enforcement of Title VI, that
one court issued a unique order that prescribed strict time periods for
48
investigating and conciliating specific Title VI desegregation cases.'
144. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78-85 (1975); Cannon v. University of Chicago. 559
F.2d 1063, 1081-82 (7th Cir. 1977). But see Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private
Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislatice Ocersight or Legislation
by the Judiciary?43 FORDHA.Mi L. REv. 441, 448 (1974), which argues that this factor is
of "dubious propriety."
145. For example, it is impossible to determine how many recipients were already in
compliance when Titles VI and IX were enacted, how many voluntarily complied, or
how many changed procedures as the result of informal or internal pressure. Since voluntary compliance is one of the primary purposes of Titles VI and L such action should
be and has been encouraged.
146. HEW's enforcement responsibility under Title IX includes 16,000 public school
districts and 2,697 institutions of higher education. The backlog is noted by HEW in the
preamble of its now withdrawn proposed consolidated enforcement procedures regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1975).
HEW has statutory enforcement responsibility under Title VI for 16,000 public school
districts, 2,874 institutions of higher education, and 30,000 health and social service
agencies. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1975).
147. While most of the federal assistance for education programs comes from HEW,
there are education-related programs in other agencies. In 1974 Executive Order No.
11,761, 3 C.F.R. 843 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprintedin 20 U.S.C. § 12211 app., at 1612
(1976), was issued to facilitate coordination of federal education programs, setting up a
federal interagency committee on education with representatives from the Departments
of State, Defense, Agriculture, and Labor, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, in addition to representatives from HEW.
Many of these agencies provide federal financial assistance to education programs or
activities. See, e.g., Cooperative Agricultural Extension Work, 7 U.S.C. §§ 341-349 (1976)
(Department of Agriculture, grants to state colleges); Mutual Education and Cultural Act
of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2459 (1976) (Department of State, exchange programs); Law
Enforcement Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) (Department of Justice, grants for
law enforcement personnel training and public education programs). Other agencies,
such as the National Endowment for the Humanities and the National Endowment for
the Arts, also provide federal financial assistance to education prograns. 20 U.S.C. § 954
(1976) (NEA); 20 U.S.C. § 956 (1976) (NEH).
148. In Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the court of appeals
affirmed the holding of the trial court that HEW had failed in its statutory duty to enforce Title VI. The plaintiffs, students and parents, alleged that HEW had investigated
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In January, 1977, the Department of Justice in its Title VI coordinating role issued coordinated enforcement procedures for Title VI to all
federal agencies primarily because of the lack of effective enforcement
14 9
by the various federal agencies.

Beyond inadequate enforcement by federal agencies, there is an
additional limitation inherent in the statutory enforcement scheme.

The ultimate enforcement weapon under Titles VI and IX is termination of federal financial assistance. Because of the extreme and harsh

nature of the sanction, HEW has rarely terminated assistance in the
nearly fourteen years since the enactment of Title VI.15 0 An isolated
instance of race or sex discrimination is unlikely to result in the termination of federal assistance. However, the individual has still suf-

fered an injury for which injunctive relief should be available.

51

Although there are some instances of race and sex discrimination covered by Titles VI and IX that are also covered by other civil rights

statutes, the overlap is not total.'

52

In the absence of an implied pri-

cases but after several years had not made a finding of compliance or noncompliance,
that HEW had issued findings of noncompliance but after several years of negotiation
had not reached voluntary compliance or initiated enforcement proceedings, and that
HEW in some instances had evidence of noncompliance but had failed to investigate. In
1975 the district court modified its order to require HEW to investigate complaints alleging racial discrimination in elementary and secondary schools from the 17 southern
and border states within 90 days of receipt, to pursue voluntary compliance for no more
than 90 days, and to initiate enforcement proceedings within 30 days. Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975). A similar order resulted in Brown v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 1215 (D.D.C. 1976), for named school districts in the 33 northern
and western states. The most recent order in this phase of the Adams litigation required
HEW to seek additional staff from the Office of Management and Budget. Adams v.
Califano, C.A. No. 3095-70 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 1977) (unpublished consent order).
Various women and women's groups subsequently brought an Adams type suit alleging the failure of HEW to enforce Title IX, Women's Equity Action League v. Callfano,
C.A. No. 74-1720 (D.D.C., filed Nov. 26, 1974) (WEAL), and the same consent order
issued in Adams resolved most of the outstanding issues in WEAL.
149. 41 Fed. Reg. 52,669 (1976) (to be codified in 28 C.F.R. § 42.401). For general
criticism of HEW and its ineffective procedures see Vocational Education, supra note
35, at 1143-49; The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 40-42 (1970); Kadzielski, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Change or Continuity? 6 J.L. &
EDUC. 183, 194-96 (1977); Note, SEX DISCRIMINATION-The Enforcenwnt Provisions for Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Can be Strengthened to
Make the Title IX Regulations More Effective, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 207, 216-19 (1975).
150. The Status of Civil Rights Compliance, Interagency Status Report, Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare No. 372 (Nov. 10, 1977), shows one elementary and
secondary school and two institutions of higher education against whom enforcement
proceedings have been completed and assistance terminated.
151. See Private Rights, supra note 20, at 1429-30, arguing that the need to "make
whole" is an important factor for implying a private cause of action.
152. See text accompanying notes 6 to 13 supra.
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vate cause of action, the individual victim of race or sex discrimination may be left without an effective remedy.
D. Relevance of State Law
The fourth prong of the Cort v. Ash test considers whether the
cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law so that it
would be inappropriate to infer a private cause of action in federal
court. This final element of the Cort formula is irrelevant to the issue
of an implied private cause of action under Titles VI and IX to the
extent that the inquiry is designed to ensure comity between federal
and state courts.' 53 The argument that the protection of civil rights is
not a federal as well as a state concern is no longer viable. The state
law element of the Cort test is relevant only to those situations in
which states have exclusive power to act and has no bearing on cases
where the federal and state governments have concurrent authority.
However, the policy underlying the comity factor may apply if
administrative agencies are substituted for state courts. It has been
argued that federal courts should be as reluctant to imply a private
cause of action when federal administrative remedies exist as they are
when adequate state remedies exist.' 54 On the other hand, stating
the fourth prong as one of comity adds little to the factors already
considered under the other parts of the Cort test. In any event the
adequacy or inadequacy of the state or the federal administrative
remedy should be considered.
CONCLUSION

Under the four-prong test enunciated in Cort v. Ash the issue of
whether courts should imply a private cause of action under Titles VI
or XI is not easily resolved. An implied private cause of action is
clearly appropriate but not mandatory. Compelling arguments can be
marshalled in support of both sides of the issue. However, in light of
the statutory objectives of Titles VI and IX and the recently enacted
Attorneys' Fees Act,' 55 implying a private cause of action appears to
be the more sensible approach. Moreover, an implied private cause
of action promises increased compliance with the statutes' antidis153. The available and traditional remedy at state law was especially important to
the decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
154. See Note, The Phenomenon of ImpliedActions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial

Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the judiciary? 43 FoRDHAst L REV.
441,449-50 (1974).

155. See note 108 supra and accompanying text.
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crimination mandate, with little, if any, damage to the integrity of the
administrative process.
Close cases such as this should turn on congressional policy and
the social goals embodied in the statutes. It is clear that Congress
intended to involve federal administrative agencies in the elimination
of racial and sex based discrimination in federally assisted programs.
However, the costs and delays inherent in administrative enforcement should be weighed against any tarnishing of the image of the
administrative agency that might result from the implication of a private cause of action.
The history of compliance with the antidiscrimination mandates
of Titles VI and IX has fallen short of congressional expectations and
the hopes of the intended beneficiaries of the statutes. For example,
considerable HEW resources are committed to complying with the
numerous court orders in the Adams v. Califano litigation.lsa Since
the court of appeals affirmance in 1973 much of the agency's time and
energy has been directed toward eliminating the 1970-1973 backlog of
racial discrimination complaints, complying with additional court or1
ders, and attempting to settle the case. 57
The additional funding necessary for agencies adequately to staff
their enforcement programs is unlikely given other important interests competing for portions of the limited federal budget. Moreover,
additional funding may be unnecessary if the existing jurisdiction of
the federal courts is invoked more often. While a federal court's reluctance to increase its own workload by implying a private cause of
action is understandable, the fact is that agency action under Titles VI
58
and IX is presently reviewable in federal court.1
Two factors inherent in the administrative scheme suggest that a
private cause of action is necessary to fulfill the congressional policy
and social goals underlying the statutes. First, because of the harsh
nature of the sanction, federal agencies have been reluctant to exercise the termination power vigorously. Moreover, the real victims of a
termination order are the very beneficiaries that Titles VI and IX
were enacted to protect. Second, it may be unwise for agencies to
156. See note 148 supra. The case was originally styled Adams v. Richardson and
each new Secretary of HEW has been substituted as the named defendant.
157. See note 148 supra. The problem of complying with the Adams order is discussed in HEW's now withdrawn proposed consolidated enforcement procedures regulation. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 18,394 (1976).

158.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976); 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976); notes 117, 119 supra.

1978]

PRIVATE ACTIONS

891

focus on individual complaints of discrimination rather than implementing their own enforcement priorities.
Finally, two factors inherent in the federal court scheme point to
the utility of an implied cause of action under Titles VI and LX. First,
the prestige of the federal courts is more likely to induce public support and ultimate compliance. Second, the remedies of declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief which the judiciary alone can issue,
are uniquely suited to the effectuation of the congressional policies
underlying Titles VI and IX.

